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We present variations on a theme of Mas-Cole11 and report results on the 
existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions in which individual actions 
and the payoffs are represented by relations that are not necessarily complete or 
transitive. @? 1990 Academic Press, Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In [29], Mas-Cole11 showed the existence of a Cournot-Nash equi- 
librium distribution for games with a compact metric space of actions and 
with continuous payoffs. Mas-Colell’s result was generalized in [22] to 
situations where the space of actions is not necessarily metric, and hence 
not necessarily separable, and where the payoffs need only be upper semi- 
continuous in the individual actions. 
The economics of this problem go back to Cournot [7]. A player is 
characterized by his action set A and his payoff function u( .) which 
depends not only on the action taken but also on the probability distribu- 
tion of the actions taken by everybody else. In equilibrium, each player, in 
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choosing his best action, leads to the same distribution on the (common) 
action space on which his choice is conditioned. Thus, the problem of 
finding a Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution is a natural fixed point 
problem although the original formulation of Cournot predated the 
discovery of fixed point theorems. 
Stripped of their economic motivation, the results constitute an interesting 
application of the Ky Fan, Glicksberg fixed point theorem [ 11, 141 to a 
problem that is without an explicit linear structure and, as such, essentially 
topological, The data of the problem consist of a compact Hausdorff 
space A; the space .&(A) of Radon probability measure endowed with the 
topology of weak * convergence (as in [34] or [37]); the space aA of 
continuous real valued functions on A x d(A) endowed with the sup-norm 
topology (as in [29]); and a Radon probability measure p on %A. The 
problem is to find a Radon probability measure t on A x %A such that the 
marginal of ‘5 on aA, ‘5 *, equals ~1 and such that T gives full measure to the 
set ((a,u)~(Ax%~): ( u a, zA) > u(x, tA) for all XE A}, a set which, it bears 
emphasis, is conditioned on zA and hence on z. 
In this paper, we present a reformulation of this basic problem by 
(i) dispensing with payoff functions and focussing instead on 
preference relations; 
(ii) allowing strategy or action sets to depend on the distribution of 
actions. 
In terms of (i), we consider two classes of preference relations, one in 
which preferences are reflexive, transitive, and continuous, although not 
necessarily complete, and the other in which transitivity is replaced by a 
suitable convexity assumption. In equilibrium theory, Schmeidler [32] 
was the first to work with incomplete but transitive preferences while 
incomplete and non-transitive preferences date to Mas-Cole11 [28]; also 
see [13, 35-J. It should be noted that our second setting departs 
from [29, 221 and explicitly brings in a linear topological structure on the 
action space A. The motivation for extension (ii) goes back at least to 
Debreu’s seminal 1952 paper [S]. 
Important as these extensions are from an economic point of view, they 
also add to the technical diversity of our problem. Under our reformula- 
tion, the question we pose involves the interplay between the compact 
Hausdorff space A, the space &‘(A), the hyperspace X(A x A) of closed 
subsets of A x A endowed with a “suitable” topology, the space of con- 
tinuous functions %?(A) from A’( A) to a subspace of YP (A x A) endowed 
with a suitable topology, and finally a Randon measure on %?(A). Our 
search for a suitable topology on a particular subspace of the hyper- 
space Z(A x A) leads us to “neighboring” economic agents as formalized 
by Kannai [19], Debreu [9], Hildenbrand [16, 171, Grodal [15], 
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Chichilnisky [5], and Back [2]. Moreover, the setup of our problem leads 
us to formalize neighboring economic agents in the presence of exter- 
nalities. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the formaliza- 
tion of neighboring economic agents in the presence of externalities. In this 
section, we motivate our formalization by relating it to previous work. 
Section 3 is devoted to mathematical preliminaries. This section enables 
us to develop the necessary terminology and notation and presents the 
mathematical results on which our formulations depend. Section 4 presents 
the model and results and Section 5 collects separately two results on the 
existence of maximal elements in compact sets. These are essential 
ingredients in the proofs which follow in Section 6. References and proofs 
for the technical results in Section 3 are presented in Section 7. 
2. NEIGHBORING ECONOMIC AGENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES 
In a pioneering paper circulated in 1964, Kannai [ 191 gave a formaliza- 
tion of the intuitive idea that one economic agent is “similar” or “close” to 
another. Since an economic agent is characterized by his preferences and 
endowments, this formalization amounted, in particular, to endowing the 
space of preference relations with a topology. Kannai considered a setting 
in which each agent’s preference relation k is defined on the non-negative 
orthant of n-dimensional Euclidean space and that there is enough struc- 
ture on 2 that it can be represented by a utility function u( 2, .) on Rt 
He could then define “closeness” of two preference relations 2, 2’ by the 
metric d, where 
d(k, k’)=Max I 4 2 1 x) -4 2 ‘5 .y)l 
XERY 1+/x\* 
An alternative way of viewing Kannai’s work is to say that he endows the 
space of monotonic preference relations &? with the weakest Hausdorff 
topology making the set {(x, y, 2 ) E R: x Ry x 9: x ky > closed. 
In a subsequent contribution, Debreu [9] exploited the observation that 
continuous preference relations can be injectively mapped into the space of 
closed subsets of the product space and hence, in the context of a metric 
space of commodities, can be endowed with the topology induced by the 
Hausdorff metric. Debreu also observed that a uniformity, rather than a 
metric, would suffice for his results. 
This identification of a preference relation with a closed subset of the 
product of the underlying commodity space prompts one to consider any 
topology on the space of closed subsets of a topological space, the hyper- 
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space of that topological space, as potentially relevant to the problem of 
defining neighboring economic agents. The relative merit of one topology 
as opposed to another would then depend on the economic problem that 
is being studied. Accordingly, in [ 161, Hildenbrand worked with the 
topology of closed convergence. He was motivated, in part, by the fact that 
the Hausdorff metric topology proposed by Debreu is not separable 
whereas the topology of closed convergence is not only separable but also 
metrizable. Moreover, on the space of monotonic preferences, this topology 
coincides with that proposed by Kannai. Hildenbrand allowed consump- 
tion sets to differ among agents but stayed within the context of 
n-dimensional Euclidean space. On all of this, see [ 17, Sect. 1.23 for details. 
Hildenbrand’s work was extended by Grodal [ 151, and more recently by 
Back [2], but both remain in R”. 
Chichilnisky [S], on the other hand, was motivated in part by a search 
for a topology that was sensitive to the Bore1 measure of the “lower 
contour set” of a preference relation. Accordingly, she formalized the idea 
of neighboring economic agents through the use of the order topology on 
the space of closed subsets of a product of a connected, normal space. She 
showed, in particular, that her formalization led to a topology on the space 
of agents that was strictly finer than that provided both by the Hausdorff 
metric as well as the closed convergence topologies in the setting of a compact 
metric space of commodities. 
None of this literature allows for “externalities” in consumption. Put 
another way, it does not allow consumption sets and preference relations 
to respond to changes in the “actions” of other economic agents. Such 
dependence is, of course, an essential aspect of the Cournot-Nash problem 
as can be seen in the original formulations of Nash [30] and Debreu [S]. 
Nash and Debreu, however, considered games with a finite set of players 
and, .in such a setting, allowed each player’s strategy set and payoff 
function to depend continuously on the action of each and every other 
player. In the context of games with a continuum of players, the situation 
is much less straightforward. We turn to this. 
One can discern four distinct formulations of externalities in games with 
a continuum of players. Two of these go back to Schmeidler [33] in the 
context of a measure of space of players. Under the first formulation, 
Schmeidler allows each player’s payoff function to depend on the actions 
taken by almost all players as embodied in the equivalence class of 
measurable functions from the space of players to a common strategy set 
in R”. Schmeidler’s formulation has been the object of extensive work; see, 
for example, [20, 21, 25, 381 and their references. Under the second for- 
mulation, Schmeidler specializes to a situation under which each player’s 
payoff is made to depend on the “average response” of the other players. 
This average response is formalized as an integral of the actions or “plays” 
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of the other players. This formulation has also been extended to situations 
when the payoffs are represented by preference relations over strategy sets 
that are subsets of a Banach space; see [20] and the references therein. 
The third formulation is due to Mas-Cole11 [29]. Unlike Schmeidler’s 
first formulation, Mas-Cole11 also limits himself to a dependence on the 
average response but formalizes this response as a distribution, rather than 
an integral, of the actions of the other players. Thus, if A denotes the 
common strategy set, and ./&‘(A) the space of probability measures on A, 
the payoff functions in Mas-Cole11 are continuous real-valued functions on 
A x &(A). 
In [22], the payoff functions of Mas-Cole11 are viewed in a different way 
and this gives us our fourth formulation. Under this formulation, a 
continuous real-valued function on A x M(A) is viewed as a family of 
continuous real-valued functions on A and parameterized by elements of 
.h!(A), i.e., as a function from .,&‘(A) into RA. We shall use this alternative 
viewpoint to present the formulation of externalities and dependence that 
is studied in this paper. This can now be used to generalize the work of 
Kannai, Debreu, Hildenbrand, and Chichilnisky to situations with 
externalities. 
An economic agent or a player is now characterizated as a continuous 
function from M(A) to the space of preference relations on A, $(A). Thus, 
for any f~ V(A) and any r E &‘(A), f(s) gives a strategy set and a 
preference relation defined on that strategy set. Two economic agents or 
players, f and g, are considered to be “close” if f and g are close. Our for- 
mulation thus proceeds in two distinct steps. In the first place, using the 
topology on A, we endow the space F(A) with a topology. This could be 
any of the topologies discussed in the first part of this section. Next, and 
dependent on the topology on .9(A), we endow the space of continuous 
functions from ,&‘(A) to F(A) with a suitable topology. This typically 
involves the compact-open topology and another topology that we intro- 
duce and which seems more natural for our problem. However, a discussion 
of these necessarily involves a more formal exposition. 
3. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES 
Let A be a compact Hausdorff space and #(A) denote the space of 
closed subsets of A. Note that the empty set q3 is an element of P(A). We 
shall say that P E %(A x A) is reflexiue if (a, a) E P for all a E A and that P 
is complementedly transitive if (a, b) E P”, (b, c) E P” implies (a, c) E P”, 
where P” represents the complement of P in A x A and a, b, c are arbitrary 
elements in A. Any (x, y) E P” can be read as “x is preferred to y” and alter- 
natively denoted x > y. Analogously, any (x, y) E P can be read as “y is 
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preferred or indifferent to x” and alternatively denoted y 2 x. For any 
BEX(A), B#@, let 
&(A ) = (P E A?( B x B) : P is reflexive 
and complementedly transitive}, 
P(A)= (J FB(A). 
BcX(A) 
BZd 
9(A) represents the space of preference relations and we shall view it as 
a subspace of #(A x A) endowed with one of two possible topologies. 
The first topology we consider is the topology of closed convergence 
which was first applied in equilibrium theory by Hildenbrand [16] and 
proposed by Mertens (see [ 17, p. 1081). This topology has as its sub-base 
sets of the form 
where K and G are respectively compact and open subsets of A x A. For 
more details into this topology, the reader is referred to [ 17, 261 and their 
references. We shall need the following preliminary result. 
THEOREM 3.1. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, then F(A) is a compact 
Hausdorff space in the topology of closed convergence. 
The second topology that we consider is the order topology first applied 
in equilibrium theory by Chichilnisky [5]. Consider the subset &(A x A) 
of %(A x A) given by 
where cl and Int denote closure and interior, respectively. The space 
XO(A x A) can be endowed with an order structure 7 under which, for any 
X, Yin&(AxA), 
x5 Y if and only if Y c Int (X). 
Following [S, especially footnote lo], SO(A x A) can be endowed with a 
topology, the order topologogy, which has its sub-base sets of the form 
{XEJ&~ xA): X 5 Y} and {XEX~(A x A): Y 3 X} 
for any Y in s$~(A x A). Let F,(A) = XO(A x A) n F(A). 
We can now state 
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THEOREM 3.2. Jj’ A is u compuct Hausdo~~~ .spcrce, tflen .3;( A x A) 
endowed with the order topolog?x is CI c~ompletcl~~ regulur space, und hence tfzp 
relative topology! on .&(A) is completel>~ regulrrr. 
In [S], it is shown that the order topology is liner than the topology of 
closed convergence in the case when A is compact metric. Our next result 
offers a generalization of this to a non-metric setting. 
THEOREM 3.3. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, then the order topol- 
ogy on XO(A x A) is finer than the topology of closed convergence on 
.ytn,(A x A). 
Next, we consider the space of Radon probability measures defined on 
S?(A), the Bore1 a-algebra on A. Denote this space by M(A) and endow it 
with the relative weak * (or narrow) topology (see [34] or [37] for 
details). We can now state the following preliminary result. 
THEOREM 3.4. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, &(A) is a compact 
Hausdorff space in the (relative) narrow topology. 
Our final set of preliminary concepts concerns the space of continuous 
functions from &(A) into the space of preference relations. When the space 
of preference relations B(A) is endowed with the topology of closed con- 
vergence, we shall denote the space of continuous functions from M(A) 
into 9(A) by V(A). When the space of preference relations is chosen from 
SO(A x A) and endowed with the order topology, we shall use the notation 
%,JA) for the space of continuous functions from &?‘(A) into &(A). We 
shall endow the spaces %‘(A) and W,,(A) with one of two possible 
topologies. 
The first topology that we consider on V(A) is the graph topology. This 
is the relativization of the topology of closed convergence on &(A) x B(A) 
to the space consisting of the graphs of the elements in %(A). Accordingly, 
we shall say that a net {f “} chosen from %(A) converges to an element f
in W(A) if and only if the graph off”, Gr(f ‘), converges in the topology of 
closed convergence to Gr( f ). Since f" and f are continuous functions and 
their range is a Hausdorff space, their graphs are closed subsets of 
&(A)xB(A). Moreover, given Theorems 3.1 and 3.4, -M(A)x 9(A) is 
compact and hence the topology is well defined (see [ 231). Indeed, one can 
say more. 
THEOREM 3.5. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, then g(A) endowed 
with the graph topology is Hausdorff and completely regular. 
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The second topology that we consider on %(A) is the compact-open 
topology. This has as its sub-base sets of the form 
{fe WA ):fW) = u> 3(K, U), K compact, U open. 
The relationship between the topology of closed convergence and the 
compact-open topology is given by the following result. 
THEOREM 3.6. Zf A is a compact Hausdorff space, then the graph topol- 
ogy and the compact-open topology are identical on %?(A). 
Next, we turn to %&(A). The first point to be noted is that &(A) is not 
necessarily compact but, as established in Theorem 3.2, only completely 
regular. Nevertheless, we can state a result on which the importance of the 
compact-open topology is partly based. 
THEOREM 3.1. Zf A is a compact Hausdorff space, then VJA), endowed 
with the compact-open topology, is a completely regular Hausdorff space. 
The question remains as to whether the graph topology has any 
relevance for G?&(A). A little reflection leads one to an affirmative, and 
somewhat surprising, answer. Since &(A) is completely regular, it can be 
embedded in a compact Hausdorff space X(A); see, for example, [ 10, 
p. 243, paragraph 23. Furthermore, a continuous function from &(A) into 
&(A) has a closed (indeed compact) graph in &‘(A) x X(A). This obser- 
vation allows us to define the graph topology on %$(A) and to state a 
generalization of Theorem 3.6. 
THEOREM 3.8. Zf A is a compact Hausdorff space, then the compact-open 
topology on C&,(A) is identical to the relativization on W,,(A) of the topology 
of closed convergence on &?(A) x X(A), where X(A) is a compact 
Hausdorff space in which F,JA) is embedded. 
We shall refer to this relative topology on %?,,(A) as the induced graph 
topology on %&(A). 
4. THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
We now have all the technical machinery we need to develop the 
principal results of this paper. We state a preliminary definition with the 
remark that a Radon probability measure on a topological space is to 
be understood as being defined on the Bore1 g-algebra generated by the 
topology on that space. 
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DEFINITION 4.1. A game on %?(A) is a Radon probability measure on 
??(A), i.e., an element of &(%(A)). 
It should be noted that Definition 4.1 is not specific as to the topology 
on %?(A). The same is true for the definition to follow. It is only in the 
statement of our results that we shall specify the topologies on %‘(A). 
For any P E FB(.4), let 
M(P)= {aEB:VbEB, (b,a)#P’}. 
M(P) thus denotes the set of maximal elements in B for the preference 
relation P defined on B x B. We can now state our reformulation of a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution. 
DEFINITION 4.2. A Bore1 probability measure r on A x %?(A) is a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of a game ,u on %(A) if 
(i) the marginal distribution of T on %‘(A), rScAj, equals ~1, 
(ii) t(B,) = 1, where B, = { (a,f)E A x%?(A): aE M(f(TA))}. 
We can now present. 
THEOREM 4.1. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, there exists a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of a game on %‘(A) if V(A) is 
endowed with the induced graph topology, or equivalently, with the compact- 
open topology. 
Next, we consider the space %$(A). We can define a game on %$(A) as 
well as the Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of such a game by 
substituting $,(A) for g(A) in Definitions 4.1 and 4.2. 
We can now state 
THEOREM 4.2. If A is a compact Hausdorff space, there exists a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of a game on %?,,(A) if %$,(A) is 
endowed with the induced graph topology, or equivalently, with the compact- 
open topology. 
For our next result, we assume that A is a convex, compact subset of a 
topological vector space. We shall say that P E %‘(A x A) is irrefi’exiuely 
convex if for any a E A, a $ con {b: (6, a) E P’), where con W denotes the 
convex hull of a set W. For any BE X’(A) with B convex, let 
F-“,“(A) = (PE Z(B x B): P is irreflexively convex} 
F’(A)= u RF(B). 
BEsP(A) 
B convex 
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In keeping with our earlier notation, we shall let V”(A) denote the space 
of continuous functions from A’(A) into P’(A) when the latter is 
endowed with the topology of closed convergence. V:(A) denotes the 
space of continuous functions from A!(A) into a subset of FC”(A) obtained 
by considering sets in &(A x A) and with that subset endowed with the 
order topology. 
We can now state analogues of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 to a setup where 
the payoffs are not necessarily generated by transitive relations. 
THEOREM 4.3. If A is a compact convex subset of Hausdorff topological 
vector space, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution of a game 
on V’(A), or on %‘?(A), tf these spaces are endowed with their induced 
graph topologies, or equivalently, with their compact-open topologies. 
Note that we have no result on the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria 
in games on %?‘“(A) when the latter is endowed with the graph topology. 
The reason for this lies in the absence of the compactness property of 
F”‘(A) when the latter is endowed with the topology of closed con- 
vergence; see Grodal [ 151 for a counter example. 
5. ON THE EXISTENCE OF MAXIMAL ELEMENTS IN COMPACT SETS 
In this section we present two results on the existence of maximal 
elements with respect o PC in a compact set. These results constitute essen- 
tial ingredients in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 but since they may 
have independent interest, we have collected them in a separate section, It 
is worth stating, however, that the results themselves are essentially known 
in the mathematical economics literature and we detail this in the accom- 
panying remarks below. 
We can now present 
THEOREM 5.1. For any P E RtJ A), M(P) # @. 
COROLLARY 5.1. Theorem 5.1 is valid for any P E FB( A) n &( A x A). 
Next, we present analogous results for the convex, non-transitive case. 
THEOREM 5.2. For any PE 9;(A), M(P) # 0. 
COROLLARY 5.2. Theorem 5.2 is valid for any P E 9”,“(A) n &(A x A). 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. 
Suppose M(P) = 0 and let O,Y = { y E B: (x, y) E P”} for any x E B. For 
any aE B, there exists be B such that a E 0,. If not, then for all b E B, 
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~$0,. This means that (h, a) $ P’, i.e., CIE M(P), a contradiction to the 
emptiness of M(P). Also note that for any h E B, O,, being a projection of 
an open set, is also open. Hence {O,},, B is an open cover of B. Since B 
is compact, it has a finite subcover. Pick a finite subcover with the smallest 
number of elements and let this number be k. Hence there exists hie B, 
i=l , . . . . k such that Bc lJf=, O,,. 
Next we show that k = 1. Suppose not, i.e., k is an integer greater than 
one. Certainly b, r# Ohl.. Then there exists i < k such that 6, E O,!. Now pick 
any y E O,,. Then by complemented transitivity of P, ,v E Oh,. Hence 
Ohi c 0,, and we have contradicted the fact that we had a smallest sub- 
cover. Hence B c O,, . But this implies that b, E O,,, a final contradiction 
completes the proof. m 
Remark 1. Theorem 5.1 was first stated and proved by Schmeidler [32, 
Lemma 21 for the case when X is a subset of R”. On comparison, the 
reader will find that our proof is slightly different from his. 
Proqf qf‘ Theorem 5.2. 
For any a E B, let T(a) = con {b E B: (6, a) E P”j. Suppose there exists 
a E B such that T(a) = @. Then for all b 4 B, (b, a) E PC, i.e., a E M(P), and 
the proof is finished. Thus, assume that T(a) # 0 for all a E B. 
For any a E B, T(u) is a convex set by construction. Now for any 
be B, consider T ‘(b) = { aEB:bET(a)}=con{aEB:(b,a)EP”}. This is 
precisely the convex hull of the set 0, defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1 
and it is open in B; see, for example, Lemma 5.1 in [4]. (If Oh is empty, 
the claim is a trivial one.) 
Thus all the conditions of Browder’s fixed point theorem [4] are 
satisfied and there exists a* E B such that a* E T(a*), i.e., a* E 
con {b: (b, a*) E P’ }, an impossibility. Hence we have contradicted our 
assumption that T(a) # @ for all a E B. The proof is finished. 1 
Remark 2. Theorem 5.2 goes back to Sonnenschein [36] for the case 
when X= R”; also see Anderson [ 1, Theorem 11. The most up-to-date 
reference is Yannelis and Prabhakar [39]. 
6. PROOFS OF THE PRINCIPAL RESULTS 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We prove the theorem for the case when %(A) is 
endowed with the compact-open topology. The proof for the case when 
V(A) is endowed with the graph topology then follows from Theorem 3.6. 
As in Mas-Cole11 [29], the proof is an application of the Ky Fan, 
Glicksberg fixed point theorem [ll, 143; (also see, for example, Berge 
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[3, p. 251 I). We show in a series of claims that all the conditions for the 
applicability of this theorem are satisfied. Let 
Claim 1. Y is nonempty. 
Since Dirac measures are in A(A), certainly we are guaranteed that 
&(A) # @. Since ~E&(V(A)), we can now appeal to Theorem 17 in 
Schwartz [34, p. 631 to assert the existence of a unique Radon measure 3, 
on A x %?(A) such that 
A(B x C) = v(B) p(C) for all BE&?(A), CEB(%?(A)). (*) 
Note that Schwartz states (*) in his theorem in terms of the essential outer 
measure but since we are dealing with probability measures, the distinction 
can be nelected. The reason for this is that we have defined a Randon 
measure in terms of Definition R3 of Schwartz [34, p. 131 and from the 
proof of R, * R, (Schwartz [ 34, p. 13]), we see that the measure of a set 
with finite measure equals the essential outer measure of that set. 
From (*) we obtain 
&y,,(B) = 4A x B) = 44) P(B) = P(B) for all BE 99(%(A)). 
Since 1(A x %?(A)) = v(A) p(%(A)) = 1 and since, by definition, measures 
are non-negative, i E Y and the proof of the claim is complete. 
Claim 2. T is convex. 
Pick p’, p2 from Y and I a real number such that 0 <A < 1. Then it is 
routinely checked that the marginal of @’ + (1 - A) p* on w(A) is p and 
that ~~‘+(l-~)~2~~(%?(A)~A). 
Claim 3. Y is compact. 
We show first that Y is tight (equally interiorly regular or equally tight 
in the terminology of Schwartz [34, p. 379, Definition 41). Towards this 
end, pick any 6 >O. Since ALE M(%?(A)), there exists a compact set 
Kc V(A) such that p(K) > 1 - 6. Since the marginal of y on V(A) for any 
y E Y is p, certainly 
Y(A x K) = ~w(z,j(K) = 149 ’ 1 - 6. 
Hence we can appeal to Theorem 3 in [34, p. 3791 (also see Topsoe [ 37, 
Theorem 9.11) to assert that Y is relatively compact. 
All that remains to be shown is that Y is closed in &(A x%?(A)). To 
show this, pick a net {y”> from Y such that y” + y. For any closed set F 
409!,46’2-11 
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in %?(A), we know by the Portmanteau theorem (Theorem 8.1 in [37]) that 
lim sup y”(A x F) d ?(A x F). This can be rewritten as 
Since ?“(A x%‘(A))= 1 for all 2, and ?(A x%(A))= 1, we conclude by a 
second application of the Portmanteau theorem that ?;(A) + yscA,. Since 
Y&, = ,u for all u, ?‘%(A) =,n and the proof is complete. 
Remark 3. The proof of Claim 3 offered here is different from that in 
Khan [22] which relied on a lemma of Hoffman-Jorgenson [lS], rather 
than on the relative compactness of a tight subset of a space. 
Claim 4. B: ~~ + 2A x ” (Ai has a closed graph. 
Let ry -+r, (a”, S”) + (a,f), and (a”,f’) E B,,. We must show that 
(adEB,. 
As in the proof of Claim 3, we can show that r> -+ zA. Furthermore, 
since f” -f in the compact-open topology, and since &(A) is compact 
Hausdorff by Theorem 3.2, we can appeal to the fact that the evaluation 
map is continuous; see, for example, Dugundji [ 10, Theorem X11.2.4, 
p. 2601. Hencef”(r>) +f(z,). 
Since (a”,f”) E B,,,, a’ E M(f”(r>)) and hence (a”, a’) of”. Since 
f”(r>) +S(rA) and (a”, a’) + (a, a), certainly a ED where DE A?(A) is such 
that f(rA) E FD(A). 
Now suppose a$ M(f(rA)). Then there exists b E D such that 
(b, a) E (f(rA))“. Since D is compact, Hausdorff, certainly D x D is regular. 
Hence there exists a neighborhood U of (b, a) and an open set V3f(rA) 
such that U n V= a. Relying on the definition of the topology of closed 
convergence this means that there exist D’cX(A) such that f’(r>)~ 
FDV(A) and b”E D’ and V such (b’, a”) E (f”(r>))’ for all v > V. But this is 
a contradiction to the fact that (a”, f”) E B,, for all v. 
Claim 5. For any r E Y-, B, is a closed set in V(A) x A. 
This is a simple consequence of Claim 4. 
Next, we consider the map Q: Y -+ 2Y such that 
Q(T)= {peF:p(B,)= I>. 
Claim 6. For any r~r-, Q(r)#@. 
The proof of this claim relies on the fact that the Dirac point measures 
on a topological measure space are dense in the space of probability 
measures on that space. Specifically, Theorem 11.1 in Topsoe [ 37, p. 48) 
assures us of a net {p”} converging to p such that each p” has a finite 
support. Pick a particular py and assume that its support consists of k 
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elements, fi,fi, . . . . fk. F rom Theorem 5.1, we know that M(fi(rA))# @. 
Let q~M(f;(r,)). Certainly (ai,fi)~A x%?(A). Now for any WEB(A) x 
B(W(A)) let 
P(W)= 1 if (a,,fi)~ W 
=o otherwise. 
It is easy to see that ~“EA(A x??(A)). Since {(a;,f,)} is a compact set 
in A x%?(A), for any WES?(A) x g(V(A)) and for any E >O, certainly 
6Yi({u,fi})>bYi(W)-~. N ow define, for any WE~I(A)X~(V(A)), 
h”(W) = i dyi( W) /l”(fi). 
i=l 
Again, it is clear that 6’ E &!(A x %?(A)). 
We now show that the marginal of 6” on %(A) is PI’. Pick any 
FE g(%?(A)). Then 
&e,,,(F) = 8”(A x F) = 1 6”‘(A x F) p”(A) 
i= 1 
= ;, P’(fA where I= {i~(l . ..k).f,eF} 
= pv( F). 
We can also show that bY(BT) = 1. To see this, simply note that 
up= I {ui,fi} is a compact set and this is contained in B,. 
Next consider the marginal of 6” on A. Since &!(A) is compact by virtue 
of [38, p. 761 (also [34, p. 379]), there exists a subnet Jp such that Ss 
converges to a limit c( in &(A). 
Given that %?(A) is completely regular by virtue of Theorem 3.5, and that 
A, being compact Hausdorff, is also completely regular, we can appeal to 
Dugundji [ 10; Theorem VII. 7.2, p. 1541 to assert that A x (A) is com- 
pletely regular. We can now apply Lemma 5.1 in Hoffman-Jorgenson [ 181 
to assert the existence of a measure 6* E &(A x%?(A)) such that S: = CI and 
6&,, = p and such that dp -+ 6*. 
Since B, is a closed set by virtue of Claim 4, we can appeal to the 
Portmanteau theorem in [37] to assert that S*(B,) > lim sup hP(B,) = 1. 
Since 6*(A x V(A)) = p(%‘(A)) = 1, d*(B,) = 1. Hence 6* E Q(r) and the 
proof of the claim is complete. 
Claim 7. Q is an upper semicontinuous correspondence. 
Since Y is compact, it suffices to show that Q has a closed graph (see 
Berge [3, p. 112, Corollary]). Towards this end, let T’ -+ r, p” E Q(r”), and 
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p” + p. We must show that p(B,) = 1. Since p is a Radon measure, it suf- 
fices to show that p(K) = 0 for all compact Kc B:. By Claim 4, we know 
that lim sup B,, c B,. Hence Kc (lim sup B,,)‘. From Klein and Thompson 
[26, Proposition 3.2.111, we obtain 
where A denotes the closure of A. Since K is compact, every open cover has 
a finite subcover. Hence there exists a’ such that 
By the monotonicity property of a measure 
P(K)GP ((pB;;)o 
and by the Portmanteau theorem [38] we obtain 
p(K)Qliminfp’(K)<liminfp’ 
((pD 
Now for any v > N’, ~ ( 
B,“c u B,, which implies Bz,x 
Y>d 
Hence, by the monotonicity property of a measure, 
p((~B,l)r)<p’(B:.)=O. 
The proof of the claim is finished. 
Remark 4. The proof presented here is a simplification of the one 
presented for an analogous claim in [22]. 
We can now apply the Ky Fan, Glicksberg fixed point theorem (see, for 
example, Berge [3, p. 2511) to the map Q to complete the proof of the 
theorem. 1 
Remark 5. We have provided the proof of Theorem 4.1 with W(A) 
endowed with the compact-open topology. In particular, we used in the 
proof of Claim 4 the fact that the evaluation map .,@(A) x W(A) + F(A) is 
continuous. If, instead, we had considered the case where g(A) is endowed 
with the graph topology, a direct proof is available. As in the proof of 
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Claim 3, let r; + rA and f” +f in the graph topology on %(A). We shall 
show f “(7;) -, f (zA). 
Since the net (t>, f “(r>)) lies in a compact set, we can find a subnet, also 
indexed by v, such that (z>, f”(z;)) converges to (r,, b), where bEF(A). 
Since (T#,f”(z”,))EGr(f”), and since Gr(f”)+Gr(f), we obtain that 
(TV, b)EGr(f). But f is a function and hence b=f(t,). 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof is identical to that of the proof of 
Theorem 4.1 except for the fact that we appeal to Theorem 3.8 to show the 
equivalence between the compact-open topology and the induced graph 
topology on %$(A). 1 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Again, we follow the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 
4.2 but with Theorem 5.2 substituted for Theorem 5.1 in the proof of 
Claim 6. 1 
7. PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION 3 
We begin with a 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. It is well known that the space of closed subsets 
of a locally compact space endowed with the topology of closed con- 
vergence is compact; see, for example, Problem 3 in [ 171. Hence, we must 
show that 9(A) is a closed subset of %(A x A). Towards this end, pick a 
net {Pv} from 9(A) such that P, + P. We must show PE F(A). Let 
B, E X(A) such that P, E FB,(A). Since X(A) is compact, Hausdorff, there 
exists a subnet, also indexed by v, such that B, + B. We shall show that 
P E .9$(A). 
We first show that P is an element of Z(B x B) and is reflexive. Since A 
is compact, certainly B # 0. Pick any (a, 6) E P. There exists (a”, b”) E P, 
for each v such that (a”, b”) + (a, b). Since a”, b” E B,, (a, b) B x B, and 
hence P c B x B. Pick any b E B. By the definition of closed convergence, 
we can construct a subnet {B,} of {B,} and b, E B, such that b, + 6. Since 
P, E F&(A), certainly (b,, b,) E P,. Since P, + P, again by the definition of 
closed convergence, (b, b) E P. 
Next, we show that P is complementedly transitive. In what follows, we 
shall take complements of P and P, in B x B and B, x B,, respectively. Sup- 
pose (a, b) E PC, (6, c) E PC but (a, c) # P’. Since (a, c) E P and P, + P, there 
exists (a”, c”) E P, such that (a’, c”) + (a, c). Since B, -+ B, there exists 
b” E B, such that b” -+ b. Hence (a”, b”) + (a, b) and (b”, c”) + (b, c). By 
[ 12, Proposition 3.11, there exists V such that (a”, b”) $ P, and (b’, c”) $ P, 
for all v > V. This implies (a”, c”) $ P, or that (a”, c”) E P,, a contradiction. 
The proof of the theorem is complete. 1 
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. See the proof of Theorem 2 in Khan and Sun 
c241. I 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. See the proof of Theorem 1 in Khan and Sun 
~241. I 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. See, for example, the Notes to Section 11 in 
Topsoe [37, p. 761, (also Schwartz [34, p. 3791). 1 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Since A(A) is compact Hausdorff by virtue of 
Theorem 3.4 and since Y(A) endowed with the topology of closed con- 
vergence is compact by virtue of Theorem 3.1, %?(A) endowed with the 
graph topology is a subspace of a compact Hausdorff space. Hence it is 
normal and therefore completely regular and Hausdorff. Since a subspace 
of a completely regular Hausdorff space is completely regular and 
Hausdorff (see, for example, [ 10, VII.7.2( 1 )]), we are done. a 
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Since A is compact Hausdorff, A(A) is compact 
Hausdorff by Theorem 3.4. Furthermore, P(A), endowed with the topol- 
ogy of closed convergence, is compact Hausdorff by Theorem 3.1. We can 
now apply Corollary 1 in Khan and Sun [23]. 1 
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Since the range of an element in %$,(A) is a com- 
pletely regular Hausdorff space by virtue of Theorem 3.3, the claim is a 
direct consequence of Nagata [31, Theorem F, p. 2721. 1 
Proof of Theorem 3.8. See the proof of Corollary 2 in Khan and Sun 
~231. I 
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